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COMMENTARY
RAISING THE PRICE OF PORK IN TEXAS: A
FEW THOUGHTS ON GHOSH, BUSH, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES
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INTRODUCTION

Hailing originally as I do from the tranquil obscurity of
small-town Iowa, a state that three million people share with
fifteen million pigs,' my feelings are normally somewhat
complicated about pork. My feelings are clear, however, about the
special dish of fatty pork served up to American and Southwest
Airlines not long ago in Dallas. The authorities there, under
dubious circumstances,2 cut a deal with those two airlines to head
off what could have been a substantial, pro-consumer advance in
competitive air transportation. They agreed to help replace a
protectionist federal statute that sheltered the incumbent carrier
in the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) area-American Airlines-with
another that would extend new anticompetitive protection to a
challenger that could no longer be ignored-Southwest Airlines.
That agreement, as the parties intended, has been explicitly
incorporated into federal law (in a statute I will refer to as the
"Reform Act").3 It so happens that the agreement in some sense
resolves more than thirty years of struggle to establish efficient
airport service in North Texas, a drawn out and often bitter
affair always punctuated by direct interventions by Congress,
federal regulators, and the Texas congressional delegation.4 But
the agreement was at best a very costly and problematic solution.
1.

Jerry Adler, A Tale of Two Hogs, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 2002, at 56, 56.

Incidentally, the pigs don't yet have representation in the legislature, which is the real
outrage. If they ever get it, those farmers are gonna have some 'splaininto do.
2. The negotiations that led to the agreement at issue in this Commentary were
conducted, during the summer of 2006, by Dallas and Fort Worth city officials and
executives of the two private airlines behind closed doors-in a hotel conference room, of
all things-and apparently at breakneck speed. See Margaret Allen, Critics Blasting
'Backroom Deal',DALLAS Bus. J., June 30, 2006, at 1.

3. The negotiations resulted initially in a June 15, 2006 "Joint Statement" among
the cities, the governing board of the Dallas-Fort Worth airport, Southwest Airlines, and
American Airlines. Joint Statement Among the City of Dallas, the City of Fort Worth,
Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, and DFW International Airport to Resolve the
"Wright Amendment" Issues (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.setlovefree.com/
pdf/agree.amendment.pdf [hereinafter Joint Statement]. The Joint Statement called for a
reduction of gate capacity at Dallas's Love Field airport by more than one-third and
several steps to ensure that capacity was neither expanded nor converted to use for
international commercial passenger service, which the parties intended to restrict
exclusively to DFW. Id. Of critical importance to the agreement, each airline sought the
incorporation of the Joint Statement into federal law and made the agreement contingent
on the adoption of such a law. Id. Shortly thereafter, the Joint Statement was
incorporated into a subsequent contract, the terms of which were largely adopted as law
by Congress in the Reform Act. See Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-352, 120 Stat. 2011.
4.
See John Grantham, A Free Bird Sings the Song of the Caged: Southwest
Airlines' Fight to Repeal the Wright Amendment, 72 J. AIR L. & CoM. 429, 431-40, 453-54
(2007) (discussing the battle over airport service in North Texas and the effect of the Joint

Agreement on the dispute).
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While at least aspirationally it contemplates an end to all
protectionism in North Texas aviation-after eight years from its
adoption, that is-it would do so only after carving up that
market between a few behemoth players who will enjoy the
intervening years of well-protected market power! An even
bigger point, it seems to me, is that it remains pure speculation
whether expiration of the eight-year term will actually be the end
of government-granted monopoly in North Texas. Given the
efforts of Southwest and American to keep competition at bay
thus far, that seems unlikely.
Still, what seems somehow worst about the Love Field deal
is that it will conclude in one very visible, tragically symbolic
physical manifestation. The cities of Dallas and Fort Worth did
not just conspire to use public dollars and their sovereign powers
to buy a new, $20 million luxury airline terminal at Love Field,
with the intent to take it out of service. The cities plan to
physically destroy that terminal completely.'
This was a bad deal, of a kind which should be prohibited by
federal law. One might have guessed as much from the rhetoric
that surrounded it-a senator behind it was a lady that I think
protested a little too much,7 and it was accompanied by the
drearily familiar arguments of the conspirators that their critics
were really just politically biased twits in ivory towers who ought
to mind their own business.8 Of course, the critics were not just of
one political persuasion. How delicious it is, for example, that
5.
See id. at 454-55 (pointing out that during the eight-year period Continental,
American, and Southwest Airlines will enjoy continued dominance of the market).
6.
See Joint Statement, supra note 3 (providing for the "demolition of the Legend
gates immediately upon acquisition of the lease").
7.
See 152 CONG. REC. S10,560 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Hutchison) (referring to herself as "sponsor of the legislation"). A press representative for
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, who seems to have taken a keenly personal interest in the
deal, suggested when Professor Bush criticized the deal that, because Bush was not a
native Texan, he should pretty much just kiss off.
8.
Interestingly, in reading through all the public statements and press releases,
the conspirators' main substantive defense, which they repeated like an incantation, was
that the deal was "local." See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S10,560-61 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006)
(statement of Sen. Hutchison); 152 CONG. REC. S10,561-62 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006)
(letter from Dallas Mayor Miller, Dallas City Attorncy Perkins, Ft. Worth Mayer
Moncrief, & Ft. Worth City Attorney Yett); Robert Dodge & Sudeep Reddy, Wright Deal
Raises Antitrust Questions, DALLASNEWS.COM, July 25, 2006, http://www.dallasnews.com/
sharedcontentldws/bus/stories/072606dnbuswright. 148a88d.html. With respect, Boss Tweed
and Tammany Hall were also "local," and I think Tip O'Neil might point out that all pork is
local. So, one wonders just what the locality of this particular deal has to do with the price of
tea in China. Also, it may be just a smidgen misleading to describe as "local" a conspiracy of
two very large, publicly traded corporations that affects the cost of all air travel routed
through one of the largest airports in the world and the major hub of one of the world's
largest airlines, especially when those conspirators have been only too eager to seek the help
offederal policymakers, located in a city far away, when it suits their interests.
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Darren Bush and Richard Epstein are in complete accord in their
denunciations of villainy at Love Field.9 The press, including the
business press, pretty roundly condemned the deal as well. ° Still,
the Northern District of Texas just recently dismissed a suit in
antitrust brought by the former owners of the condemned
terminal in the case of Love Terminal Partnersv. City of Dallas,
holding the conspirators immune under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine." That failure in court was a main impetus for the
Symposium and was much talked about there.
Shubha Ghosh and Darren Bush were personally involved in
real-world opposition to this deal, organizing petitioning efforts
in Congress and otherwise trying to get it stopped.12 In their
paper for this Symposium, they go a step further, arguing that
Love Field was not just a bad deal, but that it is part of a larger
trend that proves something important about the antitrust
treatment of previously regulated industries. 3 Ghosh and Bush
argue (in a way uncontroversial to just about anyone except a
majority of our current Supreme Court) that predation of various
9.
Compare Letter from Darren Bush, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of
Houston, et al. to Senator Arlen Specter et al., (Aug. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/date/200608/
(arguing that the proposed
agreement hurts airline passengers, as well as advocating a repeal of the Wright
Amendment), with Letter from Richard A. Epstein, Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi., to
Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Aug. 22, 2006) (calling the Wright Amendment an
"economic bill of attainder" and the 2006 Love Field deal a "diabolical document" with
which Southwest Airlines was "bought off'). Both documents were introduced in the Love
Terminal Partners litigation. See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand
at Exhibits J, N, Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. City of Dallas, 527 F. Supp. 2d 538 (N.D.
Tex. 2007) (No. 06-1279-D).
10.
See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2 (noting critics' attacks on the lack of transparency
surrounding this "backroom deal," viewed by many as "anti-competitive"); Trebor
Banstetter & David Wethe, Experts Assail Deal on Wright, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Aug. 30, 2006, at C1 (discussing Professor Bush's letter to Congress, which sought a
rejection of the proposed Wright Amendment compromise); Robert Dodge, Love Plan
Faces Hard Questions and Antitrust Critics When Congress Returns, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Sept. 1, 2006, at D1 (summarizing criticisms); Steven Pearlstein, Low-Fare, and
Now No-Fair, WASH. POST, July 28, 2006, at D1 (explaining how the deal negatively
impacts the consumer); Mitchell Schnurman, Wright Pact Needs To Be Open to Debate,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 28, 2006, at C1 (examining the agreement's negative
effect on other low-cost carriers).
11.
Love Terminal Partners,527 F. Supp. 2d at 558, 561; see also id. at 548 ("The
essence of the [Noerr-Penningtion]doctrine is that parties who petition the government
for governmental action favorable to them cannot be prosecuted under the antitrust laws
even though their petitions are motivated by anticompetitive intent.'" (quoting Video Int'l
Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988)));
Shubha Ghosh & Darren Bush, Predatory Conduct and Predatory Legislation:
Exclusionary Tactics in Airline Markets, 45 HouS. L. REV. 343, 382-87 (2008) (analyzing
the two cases leading to the doctrine).
12.
See, e.g., Letter from Darren Bush et al. to Senator Arlen Specter et al., supra
note 9 (appealing to members of Congress against the Shelby Amendment).
13.
See Ghosh & Bush, supra note 11, at 378-91.
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kinds has been common in deregulated industries, as legacy
firms struggle to retain the privileges of regulation and preserve
the inefficient industrial organization that it fostered. 4 They
further add (maybe a little more controversially, though
indisputably it seems to me) that antitrust suits against this
predation have had disappointing results." What seems more
problematic is their claim that these disappointing results prove
something more generally about antitrust as it applies to
deregulated industries. Ghosh and Bush propose a theoretically
ambitious approach to the problem they see-an approach that
seems to call for abandonment of what they think is the courts'
unduly deferential, kid-gloves treatment of the formerly
regulated. 6 They also seem to want the law to acknowledge that
the very essence of the traditionally regulated industries was
horizontal collaboration, and perhaps hold those industries to a
more stringent antitrust standard than others. 7
There lies the nub of my commentary on Ghosh and Bush's
paper. I think that neither the Love Field case nor the other
cases they discuss actually had anything to do with regulation as
such. Those cases would have come out in pretty much the same
way regardless of the defendants' regulatory history. In fact,
while Ghosh and Bush are on to something important in their
invocation of a false judicial dichotomy between "politics" and
"markets," 8 I do not think they follow it to where it really ought
to go. In particular, I think it is not useful to focus on an alleged
judicial deference to the basic infrastructure industries, which
happened once to be subject to old-fashioned rate-and-entry
regulation.
My comments here basically ride two horses, because Ghosh
and Bush raise two important and intriguing problems. First, I
think the problem in the Love Field case and other case law they
discuss is really just the problem with all of federal antitrust.
Antitrust is in a dire state across the board. Lately, we seem near
the completion of its euthanasia, which happened pretty much as
Adams and Brock predicted, although it took a little longer than
they thought it might. 9 Even prior to the 1980s, antitrust was a
pockmarked and leprotic Swiss cheese of exemptions and
14.
Id. at 353.
15.
Id. at 373-74.
16.
Id. at 391-93.
17.
Id. at 392.
18.
Id. at 362.
19.
See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The 'New Learning' and the Euthanasia
of Antitrust, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1515-20 (1986) (describing the attacks on antitrust
laws from individuals and entities across the political spectrum in the 1980s).
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immunities, created not only by the upwards of thirty-count
'em, thirty-federal statutory exemptions which give antitrust
little or no purchase at all in broad swaths of American industry,
but also by case law immunities for political activities, local
government, labor, and regulated entities." Since then, however,
the infusion of a certain kind of economic theory and a certain
rhetoric about the costs and benefits of litigation have made it
harder and harder with each passing year for plaintiffs to press
antitrust liability. So far the culmination of this trend was seen
in last year's Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly decision,2' though
even Twombly and the Court's other recent antitrust casesalmost all of which reversed lower court opinions favoring
plaintiffs-are only one part of the Court's wide-ranging
campaign against private plaintiffs, much of it driven by explicit
tort reform rhetoric.22 Who knows how much farther the trend
will go from there.
20. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N., FEDERAL STATUTORY
EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAw 1-18 (2007) [hereinafter ABA, STATUTORY
EXEMPTIONS] (discussing the federal statutory exemptions and their historical evolution,
and the various case law immunities); see also id. at app. A (listing all statutory
exemptions currently in force and presenting a chronological list of all statutory
exemptions ever adopted).
21.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Twombly is discussed more
fully at infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
22.
In none of its recent opinions has the Court much expanded opportunities for
plaintiffs (with the limited exception of LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, 128 S. Ct.
1020, 1026 (2008), allowing some individual ERISA fiduciary claims), but in many cases it
has deliberately limited them, often considering the relevance of the asserted cost of
litigation, the "frivolousness" of class lawsuits in general, and the risk of nuisance
settlement.
Among the more notable recent rulings outside the antitrust context are Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-08 (2008) (barring state personal injury claims as
preempted by the federal Medical Devices Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90
Stat. 575 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.));
Stoneridge Investment Partners,LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766, 76972 (2008) (refusing to extend private right of action under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), or SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007),
against business entities that knowingly helped an issuer prepare false financial
statements by entering into sham transactions with issuer and providing it with
fraudulent document; the Court's decision explicitly founded on fear of the cost of
litigation and the risk of nuisance settlement); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509-11 (2007) (announcing heightened pleading standard for
securities fraud claims, which, though based on statutory authority, is reminiscent of new
standard announced in Twombly); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct.
2162, 2171-72 (2007) (holding employment discrimination claim time-barred on narrow
reading of administrative limitations rule); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct.
1057, 1062-65 (2007) (reversing state jury award of $80 million in punitive damages and
holding that damages awarded to punish defendant for injuries caused to nonparties
violates constitutional due process). See also Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, ProBusiness Decision Hews to Pattern of Roberts Court, WASH. POST, June 22, 2007, at D1
(chronicling this trend); Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court
Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al (same); cf Michael S. Greve, Does the Court
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But second, I think there is something interesting about
Love Field and the regulated industries, and it is about
"regulation" in some sense, just not in the sense that Ghosh and
Bush claim. That is, it is not that the courts are especially
deferential to formerly regulated industries. Instead, the really
interesting problem is one that could be cast as a doctrinal
problem with the antitrust political immunities. This is basically
how I will approach it below, though even that doesn't capture it
especially well. The real problem is the relationship between
federal competition policy and "government"-a relationship the
federal courts have effectively defined but that, I think, they
have mixed up on a very basic theoretical level, with bad
consequences and for no good reason."
Obviously enough, I will not try here to offer some definitive
correction that would properly reset the relationship of
competition policy and government. However, I will suggest that
improvements could be made through corrections to the political
immunity doctrines that would make it harder for state and local
governments to pass out pork, as was done at Love Field. Now,
one point made by an audience member at the Symposium is
surely true: there will always be pork in U.S. politics, and in
particular, federal antitrust can never do anything about
protectionism, favoritism, and wasteful giving in the federal

Mean
Business?, FEDERALIST
OUTLOOK,
Sept.
20,
2007,
available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26834/pub detail.asp (while taking issue with
claim that Court is ideologically anti-plaintiff, observing that recent terms have involved
large proportions of "business" cases, and acknowledging that in these cases the Court has
tended to favor defendants).
23.
Incidentally, for all my criticism of Ghosh and Bush's paper, I expect that many
of us have a natural sympathy with the latter-day institutionalism that is implied in their
paper-the sense that a running problem in antitrust law is its wide generalization of a
very abstract theory across industries, and the implicit claim that the particular facts or
structure of individual industries do not matter. It reminds one of Bush's carefully argued
institutionalist account of "deregulated" markets, under which markets are never literally
"deregulated" and rather must be understood as facilities created and defined by law and
other institutions in all cases, no matter how apparently "free." See Darren Bush & Carrie
Mayne, In (Reluctant)Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation is to Blame for California's
Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Fails lo Protect Against M arkelt Power When the Market
Rules Encourage Its Use), 83 OR. L. REV. 207, 208-10 (2004); see also Darren Bush,
Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to Deregulated
Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761, 762 (2006). This view has other eminent exponents; in
particular, it has been a long-term project of Alfred Kahn. See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn,
Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325 (1990);
Alfred E. Kahn, DeregulatorySchizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1059 (1987); see also REZA R.
DIEADJ, RESCUING REGULATION (2006) (arguing that even "deregulated" markets are
regulated through other means); Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating 'Deregulation' of
Commercial Air Travel: False Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented
Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 115-20 (1989) (same).
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Congress. 24 That this is true, however, and that it is the ugly
spectacle of democracies everywhere, does not mean that
antitrust could not at least improve matters incrementally. If
tinkering with antitrust immunities doctrine could raise the cost
of pork to its recipients at the state and local levels, it might
conceivably make our democracy work just a little bit better.
But in any case, completely aside from any instrumental
benefits, I believe there is also something to gain from a much
more serious critique than is normally given to the implied
theoretical basis on which the 2courts so sharply distinguish
public and private social ordering.
II. AIRLINE REGULATION AND THE
LOVE TERMINAL PARTNERS CASE

After decades of old-fashioned rate-and-entry regulation,
which covered virtually the whole of the industry's life until the
mid-1970s, domestic passenger air carriage has come to look
largely like a free market,26 with the exception that it still enjoys
statutory exemptions for international alliance arrangements2 7
and for agreements reached to resolve airport congestion. 28 That
history is of a piece, and is virtually synchronous with, the
history of other basic infrastructure industries-transportation,
energy, and communications-all of which were rate-and-entry
regulated from roughly the Progressive years until they faced the
24. Another audience member recommended a different solution to pork via
government-granted monopoly, including pork at the federal level: some type of federal
constitutional remedy. It was suggested, for example, that this could take the form of
some sort of substantive due process doctrine. Some pork might also be challenged on the
grounds of its impact on third persons, especially where the government's beneficiary
enjoys some particularly restrictive or anticompetitive privilege. For example, local
government restraints on transport competition might infringe the right of interstate
travel recognized in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
25. I believe the significance of this problem extends well beyond problems in
antitrust law. See generally Chris Sagers, Monism, Nominalism, and Public-Privatein
the Work of Margaret Jane Radin, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219 (2006) (arguing that the

private-public distinction routinely and illogically causes similar entities to receive
different legal treatment).
26. For one of the many authoritative histories of airline regulation and its
dismantling since the mid-1970s, see generally ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, DAVID R. GRAHAM &
DANIEL P. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985) (detailing the rationale behind
airline regulation and the effects of its removal on airlines' operation).
27. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308-41309, 42111 (2000) (granting the Secretary of
Transportation the ability to exempt airline carriers from antitrust laws).
28. See Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. 108-176,
§ 423, 117 Stat. 2490, 2552-53 (2003) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40129) (creating
the "collaborative decisionmaking pilot program," whereby air carriers may
collaboratively take steps to reduce congestion at specific airports without antitrust
liability, subject to FAA approval).
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deregulatory wrath of the Carter administration.29 However, in
the case of the airlines no one seems to think that deregulation
has gone entirely the way it was supposed to go. By most
accounts, the industry has performed poorly, with significant
rates
of business
failure, several
bankruptcies,
and
consolidations among legacy carriers." As recently as 2001, the
assets of a decades-old legacy carrier were purchased out of
bankruptcy (its third since deregulation, this one following ten
years without profit), and as of this writing the strong likelihood
is that at least one merger of legacy airlines will be announced
for 2008. 3' Though views differ as to why the industry has
performed poorly,32 no one seems seriously to doubt it, and even
some of the original prophets of airline deregulation have come to
question some of its results.33
29.
See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); see also
THOMAS K. McGRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 210-99 (1984).
30.
See generally Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, How Airline Markets
Work... Or Do They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry 18-19 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13452, 2007) (noting that, since deregulation, the
industry has seen high rates of new entry, but also business failure of smaller entrants, as
well as several bankruptcy reorganizations and a few outright liquidations of legacy
carriers; these trends, to the authors, "appear[] to reflect more than transitional
uncertainty in the aftermath of deregulation").
31.
Merger between Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines seems to be almost certain
pending regulatory approval by the Justice and Transportation Departments. See Jeff Bailey,
In the Math of Mergers, Airlines Fail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at C1 (noting the pending
takeover of Delta Airlines by either Northwest Airlines or United Airlines); Andrew Ross
Sorkin & Jeff Bailey, Northwest and Delta Edge Closer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at C1 (same);
2008: The Year of the Big Airline Merger?, DealBook, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com
2008/01109/2008-the-year-of-the-big-airline-merger/?oref=login (Jan. 9, 2008, 12:36 PM).
Most observers seem convinced that at least one more will follow, notably a possible
merger between Continental and United. Bailey, supra. This suggests that in coming
months the TEA Section at the Department of Justice may be stuck simultaneously
reviewing two separate, gargantuan mergers of major airlines. (One remaining quirk of
the industry's regulatory history is that its mergers are reviewed only by the Justice
Department; in the past, major airline mergers have been reviewed by the TEA.)
32.
Compare Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Financial Performance of the Airline
Industry Post-Deregulation,45 Hous. L. REV. 421 (2008) (amassing data to the effect that
airline performance has been poor since deregulation, and ever more so, and arguing that
this outcome is a consequence of destructive competition), and Michael E. Levine, Airline
Alliances and Systems Competition:Antitrust Policy Toward Airlines and the Department
of Justice Guidelines, 45 Hous. L. REV. 333, 334-35 (2008) (arguing, admittedly contrary
to some of his own views during 1970s deregulatory debates, that for various reasons
airlines are unlikely to perform well under unfettered competition subject to antitrust),
with Peter C. Carstensen, The Poor Financial Performance of Deregulated Airlines:
Competition as Causationor Only Correlation?Reflections on ProfessorDempsey's Article,
45 Hous. L. REv. 487, 492 (2008) (arguing that poor performance identified in Dempsey's
paper, supra, has more to do with strategic decisions of airline executives that burden
airlines with significant, long-term, fixed-payment obligations).
33.
See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 32, at 430 (illustrating how Alfred Kahn, one of
"deregulation's principal architect[s]," holds deregulation partially responsible for the
financial difficulties of the airline industry).
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As for problems at Love Field, Dallas has long been thought
to be a special case. From the beginning of passenger air carriage
in the area, the neighboring cities of Dallas and Fort Worth have
lived through a colorful and fairly bitter history of conflict. The
conflict in some sense is still unresolved, though the 2006 Love
Field agreement and the federal statute baptizing it might just
have brought it close to an end. In any case, the two cities were
thought to be too close geographically to support two competing
airports, but too far apart to share one conveniently. Each city at
different times sought to establish its own airfield, and each city
at different times enjoyed some dominance to the detriment of
the other.14 These years of conflict resulted in a fair amount of
litigation.35 Fences were partially mended only by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) itself, which in 1963 conducted a
formal study of the situation and urged the creation of the
consolidated airfield that is now DFW International Airport.36
Tellingly, one of the major protagonists of the 2006 Love
Field deal has throughout its life also been the very symbol of
Love Field. The modern history of Love Field and Congress's
peculiar interventions there, which have been Schiavo-like in
their hyper-local specificity, are intimately entwined with the
very creation of Southwest Airlines itself. The airline's founding
was a stroke of masterful opportunism at a time when DFW was
almost complete but not yet operational, when other airlines in
North Texas were vulnerable because they had all committed to
cooperation in the DFW enterprise (and therefore to limit their
competition from other fields), and, not coincidentally, when the
whole scheme of federal airline regulation was just about to
crumble.37 When it was founded, Southwest promised to remain a
low-cost alternative to traditionally dominant carriers, and that
has been the thrust of its public relations for most of the time
since (a fact that makes all the more unseemly Southwest's
active complicity in the 2006 Love Field deal).38 However, the
threat Southwest posed to DFW and American Airlines was the
impetus for the first direct intervention by Congress. Unlimited

34.
Grantham, supranote 4, at 433-35.
35.
Id. at 434-35 (noting that the two cities "took it to the courts").
36. Id. at 432-55 (setting out this history succinctly).
37. Id. at 438-39.
38.
See id. at 430 (describing Southwest's attempts to win public support for
repealing the Wright Amendment); Ryan Griffin, State Aid, the Growth of Low-Cost
Carriersin the European Union, and the Impact of the 2005 Guidelines on Financing of
Airports and Start-Up Aid to Airlines Departingfrom Regional Airports, 71 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 341, 343-44 (2006) (noting Southwest's business model as a low-cost carrier since its
inception).
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competition by Southwest was largely staved off by the so-called
Wright Amendment of 1979, a peculiarly specific federal law
applicable only to Love Field airport, which tightly limited
service out of the airport."
As it now exists, DFW is a major international outfit
through which a huge portion of domestic and international air
transport is routed. American Airlines maintains a major hub
there, is headquartered nearby, and is by far the dominant
carrier at DFW.4' As a practical matter, the Wright Amendment,
subject to some modifications, remains in effect there, sheltering
American Airlines' dominance. This is the result of the 2006 Love
Field deal, as ensconced in the federal Reform Act.4'
III. DOES LOVE TERMINAL PARTNERS REALLY HAVE
ANYTHING

To Do WITH REGULATION AS SUCH?

For having said all that, I am afraid I cannot quite agree
with Ghosh and Bush's view of things. They want primarily to
show that anemic antitrust enforcement in the airline industry is
in some way especially about regulation.4 2 Ghosh and Bush
believe that, though the industry is no longer pervasively
regulated, the courts continue to treat it as if it were and that, to
that extent, the airline case is symptomatic of the larger judicial
attitude toward deregulated markets.43 Interestingly, their
ultimate concern seems to be that the federal courts have come to
model the behavior of previously regulated industries, as a
purely a priori theoretical matter, in such a way that those
industries will be given the benefit of much more doubt than they
deserve in antitrust litigation."

39. See International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980) (amended by Pub. L. No. 109-352, 120 Stat. 2011
(2006)). This Act is commonly known as the Wright Amendment, named after its sponsor,
Rep. Jim Wright, a House Democrat from the Fort Worth area who was House Majority
Leader at the time. See Grantham, supra note 34, at 440-44 (chronicling the origins of the
Wright Amendment).
40.
Delta Airlines also maintains a DFW hub, but it is considerably smaller than
American's hub. See Richard D. Cudahy, The Airlines: Destined to Fail?, 71 J. AIR L. &
COM. 3, 14 n.57 (2006) (discussing American Airlines' "hold" on its main hub at DFW).
41. See generally Grantham, supra note 34 (exploring the likely effect of the Reform
Act).
42. See Ghosh & Bush, supra note 11, at 373-74 (discussing deference to regulatory
schemes as a basis for courts' reluctance to discourage anticompetitive conduct).
43. See id. at 367-69 (arguing that courts are reluctant to acknowledge predatory
practices in newly deregulated industries).
44. See id. at 373-74 (arguing that courts often fail to address anticompetitive
behavior because of adherence to inaccurate or incomplete theories about deregulated
markets).
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For my part, I do not believe that Love Terminal Partners
itself, or the other cases these authors discuss, would have come
out differently had the underlying industries never been
regulated. There is something harmful about the Love Field deal,
and I believe that it is symptomatic of anticompetitive predation
in the airline industry, but the story it tells is not about
regulation as such. Instead, it is a story of the evisceration of
antitrust as it applies in every industry.
Ghosh and Bush rest their argument on three main bases.
First, they examine the case law of the past few decades on
price predation as a violation of Section 1 or as the "bad
conduct" element under Section 2. 4' In large part, their critique
focuses on the Tenth Circuit's recent rejection of a Justice
Department monopolization claim against American Airlines.4 6
But, critically, Ghosh and Bush seem to acknowledge that the
opinion was virtually compelled by Supreme Court precedent
involving predation in industries that were not only never
regulated, but which are also paradigm examples of
"commodities" markets that they believe the courts treat with
less deference than deregulated firms-consumer electronics
and cigarettes. 47 That is, the Court has simply made price
predation extremely hard to prove whether the underlying
industry was ever regulated or not.4"
Next, Ghosh and Bush claim to find an important lesson in
the Supreme Court's recent handling of antitrust affairs in the
context of the interminable, decades-long saga of telecom
deregulation. They point to last year's Twombly decision 49 and
the Trinko case of a few years ago,5" which together will make it
very difficult to challenge anticompetitive deviations from the
Telecommunications Act. 5 The bulk of this second argument is
45. Id. at 346-61.
46.
See id. at 353-58 (analyzing United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th
Cir. 2003)).
See id. at 346-353 (discussing Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
47.
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), respectively).
48.
See id. at 349 (claiming that plaintiffs face nearly insurmountable hurdles when
claiming predatory pricing).
49.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
50.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
51.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 151, § 271, 110 Stat.
56, 86-88 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 271).
Incidentally, Ghosh and Bush support their interpretation of Love Terminal
Partnersby pointing out that the opinion explicitly cites Twombly, as indeed it does. See
Ghosh & Bush, supra note 11, at 390-91 (citing Love Terminal Partners,L.P. v. City of
Dallas, 527 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (N.D. Tex. 2007)). I believe their point here is incorrect.
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based on the following observation from Twombly. Admittedly,
the Court here suggested that the defendants should get the
benefit of a certain doubt because they had not long previously
emerged from regulation:
In a traditionally unregulated industry with low barriers to
entry, sparse competition among large firms dominating
separate geographical segments of the market could very
well signify illegal agreement, but here we have an obvious
alternative explanation. In the decade preceding the 1996
Act and well before that, monopoly was the norm in
telecommunications, not the exception.... The [defendant
telephone companies] were born in that world, doubtless
liked the world the way it was, and surely knew the adage
about him who lives by the sword. Hence, a natural
explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the
former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting
tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing. 5'
Still, I take a very different view of this language, which I
think is darker and more ominous than Ghosh and Bush seem to
acknowledge. This paragraph emerges in a long opinion in which
seven of our current Justices insist that all Section 1 plaintiffs
first make fairly detailed, specific allegations of "conspiracy" in
the very complaint itself, which must also be a priori "plausible"
under a presumption of rational profit maximization in a world of
easy entry and low-cost transactions." In itself, this was an
alarming extension of the related evidentiary framework already
set up in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.54
because, at least in those cases, the plaintiff would have the full
range of pretrial discovery before being called to make its case of
The court's only invocation of Twombly was the same general citation that all federal
courts must now give in deciding motions under Rule 12(b)(6). See Love Terminal
Partners,527 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
52.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972.
53.
Id. at 1965-66.
54.
Monsanto held that a verdict finding Section 1 liability must be based on some
evidence of conspiracy "tendLing] to exclude the possibility" of independent action.
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). Matsushita made clear
that this new standard incorporated an explicitly microeconomic component, holding that
plaintiffs theory of conspiracy must be "reasonable" in light of "competing inferences" to
be drawn from the record and may not be "implausible." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 593-94 (1986). This in turn plainly meant that,
in the absence of uncommonly strong evidence, the conspiracy alleged could not imply
economically irrational conduct by defendants. The Court observed that-apparently as a
matter of law-the defendants were "presumably rational businesses" and accordingly
held that "if [defendants) had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their
conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations," then the plaintiffs claim
should be dismissed at summary judgment. Id. at 595-97.
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rationality. Twombly thus amounts to a large and strongly stated
presumption of law in favor of a certain factual characterization
of the world 5
But in response to Ghosh and Bush, I believe that the
Court's alternative explanation of the Twombly defendants'
conduct-the paragraph quoted above-actually only reflects the
federal courts' ordinary application of the Monsanto/Matsushita
framework, and I think that courts apply the framework as they
do because they have made a substantive policy choice based on
their estimate of the costs and benefits of private-plaintiff
antitrust litigation. Courts not only ask plaintiffs to plead an
economically rational conspiracy consistent with easy entry and
low transaction costs, but they will also freely entertain
alternative explanations favorable to defendants that do not
satisfy that model or those assumptions. 6 Justice Souter's
hypothetical excogitations of the Baby Bells' decisionmaking
surely sounds possible enough, but it also arguably relaxes the
assumption that they are economically rational profitmaximizers.5 7 And here there is an answer for why the Court has
made the basic policy choice to burden plaintiffs and the public
with the costs of antitrust violations, while freeing defendants
from much of the cost of litigating them: tort reform rhetoric.
Twombly was studded with the Court's factual claims about the
cost and burden of antitrust litigation,58 unsupported but for a
55.
See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974 (holding that in order to avoid dismissal, a
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to make a claim of conspiracy "plausible on its face").
56.
See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1118-19 & n.13 (10th Cir.
2003) (rejecting any test of price predation that would effectively hold defendants to a
pricing standard of "short-run profit maximization," though not explaining why rational
firms would fail to meet such a standard, and further arguing that such a standard "could
lead to a strangling of competition"); cf Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008) (rejecting securities fraud plaintiffs argument
that fraudulent aiding and abetting causes plaintiffs injury wherever it assists issuer's
fraudulent statements made to an efficient market).
57.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961. Note that one explanation favorable to defendants
that would have been more consistent with the rationality assumption-a game theoretic
oligopoly explanation-is one the Court doesn't seem much to consider. Instead, the Court
considers it plausible that having been groomed during their years of regulation,
telephone company executives do not know how to compete. See id. at 1972 (indicating
telephone companies were reluctant to change noncompetitive behaviors following
deregulation and instead preferred to "sit[ ] tight").
58.
Id. at 1966 (stating the Court's concern that "a plaintiff with a 'largely
groundless claim' [might] be allowed to 'take up the time of a number of other people, with
the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value'" (quoting
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005))); id. ("[Slome threshold of
plausibility must be crossed at the outset before a[n] . . . antitrust case should be
permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase." (quoting Asahi
Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. ll. 2003))); id.at
1966-67 ("[lit is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in
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student note, an essay by Frank Easterbrook, and a report from a
conservative think-tank.5 9 The Court made the new pleading
standard it announced there applicable only to "subjects
understood"-like antitrust, evidently-"to raise a high risk of
abusive litigation."0 Thus, on its conviction that the only costs of
antitrust we ought to care about are those that burden
defendants-which seems to me plainly false 6 1-the Court has
chosen to make it very hard for Section 1 plaintiffs to get in the
courthouse door."
But again, whatever may be its merits, the point is that
Twombly did not restrict its ruling to formerly regulated
industries, and there is no reason to believe it will be so limited.
I think the case Ghosh and Bush make might be stronger on
the face of Trinko, an argument that Bush has made before,"
though it is not given too much attention here. But importantly,
even Trinko-a case self-consciously about regulation, which
arguably limited antitrust liability precisely because at the time
of litigation the defendants were still regulated in some sense"-

advance of discovery... but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery
can be expensive."); id. at 1967 ("[Tlhe threat of discovery expense will push costconscious defendants to settle even anemic cases .. ").
59.
See id. at 1964 (citing AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR.FOR REGULATORY STUDIES,
MOTIONS TO DISMISS ANTITRUST CASES: SEPARATING FACT FROM FANTASY 3-4 (2006)); id.
at 1967 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638
(1989)); id. (citing William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting
on Discovery in PrivateAntitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898-99 (2003)).
60.
Id. at 1973 n.14.
61.
The Court implicitly devalues the costs that antitrust plaintiffs face and the
new costs that are added every time the Court increases evidentiary burdens. See id. at
1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (faulting the Court for failing to give appropriate weight to
plaintiffs' costs when determining the appropriate pleading standard). Moreover, if
antitrust violations harm society, and if private enforcement importantly prevents some
of that conduct, then the Court multiplies costs for society through the very literally
legislative choice it makes in cases like Twombly.
62.
One cannot say enough how significant and possibly detrimental a decision
Twombly may turn out to be. It may be perfectly fine to erect a strong presumption
against agreement or any other issue of fact, but such a thing surely does not appear on
the face of the statute, and it is a surprising interpretation of a law that is supposed to
'strike as broadly as it could," since "[lianguage more comprehensive" than that in
Sherman Act "is difficult to conceive." United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533, 553 (1944). Indeed, if private enforcement of federal antitrust policy has any positive
value at all, then Twombly is by any measure a very scary case. For many years, the vast
majority of U.S. antitrust enforcement has been by private plaintiffs. Anne K Bingaman,
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer (1996), available at
http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/misc/antitrust/antitrus.htm.
63.
See Bush, supra note 23, at 789-92 (discussing the effect of Trinko on
deregulated industries).
64.
Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
411-14 (2004) (discussing high costs and limited benefits of layering antitrust
enforcement on top of a regulatory scheme aimed at deterring anticompetitive practices).
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is itself really just another tort-reform case. That is, Trinko was
ultimately explained according to the Court's belief that antitrust
is unduly costly given its uncertain benefits."5
Finally, as their third argument, Ghosh and Bush argue that
the Love Terminal Partners court found Noerr-Pennington
immunity under facts in which, they claim, straightforward
application of well-settled immunities doctrine should have
resulted in a clear rejection of any immunity.66 They argue at
some length that to recognize immunity for any of these
defendants would not only be incorrect, but would also upset
decades of well-settled precedent.67 Ghosh and Bush seem to feel
that the best explanation for the court's mistaken analysis is that
formerly regulated industries are given some special judicial
deference.
As a matter of fact, I think that Love Terminal Partners
probably correctly applied existing immunities law, though only
because that law remains so patently inadequate. Few federal
courts under the current state of the law would fail to find
immunity under these facts, regardless of whom the defendants
happened to be. While the Love Terminal Partners court
conceivably could have found ways around immunity through a
handful of creative arguments, not only would those arguments
not be obvious, mainstream applications of settled law, they
would be seen as fairly radical departures.
There could be no doubt that the defendants in Love
Terminal Partnersgenuinely desired the government action they
purported to seek, for indeed their very agreement was made
contingent on its adoption by Congress." Therefore it obviously
was not a "sham." 9 A different argument might be made that,
under Allied Tube and Superior Court Trial Lawyers, defendants'
conduct should not be considered Noerr "petitioning" at all.7"
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412, 414.
65.
66.
Ghosh & Bush, supra note 11, at 386-87.
67. Id. at 382.
68.
Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. City of Dallas, 527 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (N.D.
Tex. 2007).
69. See id. at 552 n.7 (explaining the idea of a "sham" situation, and stating that the
present defendant's efforts did not fit this category).
70.
In Allied Tube, the Court held that a fire safety code developed by a private,
nonprofit SSO was not entitled to Noerr immunity even though the objective of the SSO
and its members was that the code would be rubberstamped into law by state and local
governments. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495, 502,
504, 509-10 (1988). In effect, the Court held that this conduct did not constitute
petitioning within the meaning of Noerr because the "nature and context of the activity"
in question-the fact that it was conducted behind closed doors and with none of the
democratic constraints ordinarily associated with the political process-rendered it too far
removed from ordinary supplication of government to immunize it. Id. at 504. In Superior
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Even though the Love Terminal Partners parties sought federal
action as the central goal of their conduct, their negotiations
were conducted behind closed doors with little public notice,
possibly in violation of Texas open government laws.7
Conceivably, this could be analogized to the closed-door standard
setting in Allied Tube, the "context and nature" of which the
Court found too dissimilar from traditional political conduct to
immunize."2 The problem is that the Love Terminal Partners
parties then actively lobbied Congress through visible, public
means, and the agreement they reached was made contingent on
its adoption as law by Congress.73 Therefore, presumably the
agreement would have had no effect in and of itself.
Perhaps, too, some hay could be made about the fact that the
negotiations were reduced to a writing among the defendants
which they styled as a "contract."74 But giving emphasis to that
particular institutional fact would not serve any obvious purpose
under the Court's immunity decisions, especially since, again, the
contract itself was made explicitly contingent on its adoption into
federal law. 5 Likewise, no headway could be made concerning
the fact that the municipal defendants here acted in their
"market participant" roles (as airport owners or stakeholders)7 6
because, even though that has been suggested as an exception to
local government immunity under Town of Hallie,7 7 it could have
no purchase where the municipal defendant itself is a Noerr
supplicant. Noerr defendants almost always have some
commercial motive.
Incidentally, Ghosh and Bush also seem to imply that there
is some actual trend in which the lower courts, without admitting
Court Trial Lawyers, the Court held that a "strike" by government-compensated criminal
defense lawyers was not immunized by Noerr because even though the strikers' boycott
was plainly intended to bring about a government action-an increase in their
government compensation-the strike itself was illegal. FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 425, 428, 435-36 (1990). Under Superior Court Trial
Lawyers, conduct cannot constitute "petitioning" within Noerr if the conduct itself is an
antitrust violation. Id. at 428.
71.
See Allen, supra note 2 (discussing allegations that closed door meetings may
have violated state law).
72.
See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509-10.
73.
Love Terminal Partners,527 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
74.
Id. at 545.
75.
Id. at 550.
76.
Whether there is a "market participant" exception to the state action immunity
was explicitly left unresolved in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499
U.S. 365, 379 (1991) (citation omitted).
77.
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (holding that local
governments enjoy immunity from antitrust law where their actions are subject to no
more than a "clearly articulated" policy of their state government that they restrain
trade).

HeinOnline -- 45 Hous. L. Rev. 411 2008-2009

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

412

[45:2

it or defending themselves, have more generously immunized
defendants that were once regulated.7 8 However, they do not
attempt to prove that claim in their paper.
IV. THE REAL PROBLEM IN LOVE TERMINAL PARTNERS, AND
DOING SOMETHING ABOUT IT

In the end, I think there is something wrong with
"regulation," in some sense, and it is something that antitrust
might be well enough suited to address. But it is not that courts
treat formerly regulated industries differently. Rather, some of the
worst competitive problems in the country involve the icky and
extensive intimacy of our governments and our businesses. If you
want to have a monopoly in the United States, then the
government is the best friend you can have, and I happen to think
that antitrust might be able to do something about this problem.
Unfortunately, I submit that, before it has a ghost of a chance of
making a real difference, there must be some retooling of the
entire big-picture theoretical toolkit by which the federal courts
understand the relation between the private and public sectors.
In some sense, this has to have something to do with the
political immunities doctrines. It is mainly in this area that the
federal courts grapple with the relation of the federal policy of
competition to the role of ad hoc government marketplace
tinkering. In that case law, whether they like to admit it or not
(they don't), the courts have implicitly constructed an entire
conceptual apparatus by which they apportion responsibility for
competition values between public and private spheres.
So, there is something to be gained by thinking about
revised immunities law as a way of addressing antitrust
problems. I will introduce both the idea and the difficulty of
achieving it through doctrinal reform by discussing one very
impressive effort by Einer Elhauge, and one much humbler effort
by myself.79

78. See Ghosh & Bush, supra note 11, at 362-63 ("While deregulation does not
create immunity, it creates a situation where a court is deferential to legislative
determinations of how to structure a market.").
79. These two are by no means the only attempts to bring some comprehensive
clarity to the immunities doctrines, which is frequently said to be really in need of
clarification. For other efforts, see, e.g., Merrick Garland, Antitrust and State Action:
Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987); William H. Page,
Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the

State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1102-07 (1981);
John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713,

739-41 (1986).
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A. Elhauge's PeerlesslyElegant Synthesis That Doesn't Really
Work
In the early 1990s, Professor Elhauge tackled this problem
in two articles, taking up approximately 100 pages of law review
text that together set out a seamlessly unified theory of the
Supreme Court's political immunity thinking." For my money,
Professor Elhauge's analysis is among the better doctrinal law
review scholarship ever written. His ultimate argument is
elegantly simple: the Supreme Court's immunities case law,
taken as a whole, serves to ensure that in our society resource
allocations can be made in only one of two ways."1 First,
allocations can be made through decisions in competitive
markets subject to the regulatory discipline of market forces and
as kept healthy by antitrust law. 2 Second, they can be made by
decisions of democratically accountable officials.8" Resource
allocations made in any other way are illegal because only in
those two permissible ways do we have some assurance that
allocations are made in the public interest.8 4
However, a large problem remains with Elhauge's solution.
Though he explicitly denies it, Elhauge's system would require
that, where some anticompetitive harm challenged by an
antitrust plaintiff is caused by an action of government, then it
must be immunized whether the defendant is the government
entity that caused it or a private person who petitioned for it.8" As
I will explain below, this is a fatal flaw for any theory of antitrust
and government that hopes to tackle problems like the Love
Terminal Partners case.86 In Elhauge's case, it results from a
serious, if understandable, methodological flaw: he did not allow
himself to suggest any change to the Court's existing case law.
In other words, the central problem in his approach is simply the
central problem in the Court's approach.

80.
See Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust PetitioningImmunity, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 1177 (1992) [hereinafter Elhauge, Making Sense]; Einer Elhauge, The Scope of
Antitrust Process, 104 HARv. L. REV. 667 (1991).
81.
See Eihauge, Making Sense, supra note 80, at 1198 (summarizing antitrust
state action immunity).
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
See id. at 1197-98 (arguing that each process protects the public interest).
85.
See id. at 1199-1201 (indicating immunity would not apply when the restraint
is imposed by a financially interested governmental decisionmaker).
86.
See infra Part V (pointing out that "government-granted" monopolies have been
a larger problem than those caused by private parties).
87.
See Elhauge, Making Sense, supra note 80, at 1180 (limiting his analysis to an
explanation of the Court's cases).
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B. A Problem Effort of My Own
Some years ago I suggested a somewhat different approach
to dealing with the undue intimacy of state and local
governments and their private-sector counterparts. 88 While my
effort was not a general unifying one like Professor Elhauge's, it
did introduce what I still think were certain important
distinctions and clarifications. In particular, case law has
blossomed in the courts of appeals granting Noerr-Pennington
immunity to standard-setting organizations (SSOs) 8 9-private
groups, typically comprised of businesspeople, academics, and
government representatives, that promulgate regulatory codes
within their fields of specialty and then try to get the world to
follow them. SSOs have sometimes acquired very significant realworld power, and they often have strong incentives to abuse it.
Notoriously, the American Bar Association's (ABA) role both as
regulator of attorney ethics and as accreditor of law schools has
given it extensive power to create wide-ranging policy, and that
policy sometimes subsequently has the force of state law.9 ° Yet
the ABA functions without much oversight at all. Likewise,
building codes, electrical, fire, and safety codes, product design
standards, and similar codifications often come to have pervasive
influence precisely because state and local governments, feeling
the need to regulate in these areas but desiring uniformity and
doubting their own competence, adopt them without modification
or even any evidence of much deliberation.9
These groups often enough find themselves sued in
antitrust. However, in these and similar scenarios, SSOs have
managed to get themselves into a privileged situation in law. The
courts have uniformly held that, where their codes come to have
force (even by unreflective rubberstamp) through incorporation
into de jure law, then Noerr immunity protects them from the
key body of private law that would otherwise regulate their
conduct-antitrust.92 But notice that the same SSOs are quite

88. See Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting
Organizations:A Case Study in the Public-PrivateDistinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393
(2004) (opining on the proper treatment of standard-setting organizations within the
context of antitrust immunity).
89.
See infra note 92 and accompanying text (listing several cases involving SSOs
and antitrust immunity).
90.
Sagers, supra note 88, at 1400 (claiming the government's support of the ABA is
the source of the ABA's power over law schools).
91.
See id. at 1398-1402 (noting the proliferation and potential problems associated
with SSOs).
92.
See, e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026,
1034--44 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding ABA immune for law school accreditation activities);
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unlikely to be subject to constitutional, administrative, or any
law because they are perceived by the courts as
other public
"private."93 Therefore, the only deliberative body making
substantive government policy in these cases-the SSOs-is
subject to literally no law at all, and they are also obviously free
from the democratic constraints of election or public oversight.9 4
My solution for this problem was a bit roundabout. I argued
that the major thing the courts had gotten wrong in these cases
was to label powerful SSOs as merely private "persons" who
might enjoy Noerr immunity as mere individual supplicants of
government.9 5 Instead, they seemed more like the deputies of
state government trade-restraining power that are normally
subject to the so-called Midcal doctrine.9 6 At the time, I thought
the appeal of this approach was that for Midcal immunity to
apply, the state government that granted the trade-restraining
power must "actively supervise" the deputy's conduct.97 So, if
Noerr were off the table for powerful SSOs, and Midcal was their
only hope, the "active supervision" requirement might encourage
state and local governments to actually do their jobs as
democratically accountable public servants. 98
Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 17 F.3d 295, 302 (9th Cir. 1994) (immunizing
deliberate misrepresentations to SSO as valid attempts to influence government action);
Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1387 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding ABA immune for
promulgation of model ethical rules); Zavaletta v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 96, 98
(E.D. Va. 1989) (holding ABA immune); Sherman Coll. of Straight Chiropractic v. Am.
Chiropractic Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716, 722-23 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding chiropractic trade
association immune for school accreditation activities), affd, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir.
1987); cf. Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir.
1994) (determining that although psychiatric certification board's decisions were basis of
granting certain state benefits, board was not a "state actor").
Sagers, supranote 88, at 1395-96.
93.
94.
Id. at 1396.
95.
Id. at 1414-26.
96.
So named for CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
97.
See id. at 105-06 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978)) (identifying requirements that must exist before private parties are
granted immunity from antitrust actions).
98.
The Midcal immunity as written also requires that the delegation of traderestraining power be "clearly articulated" as a policy of the state government itself. See
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06 (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978)). This would be a problem for even the most influential SSOs
because, while their standards are routinely rubberstamped into state and local law after
the fact, they almost never have affirmative de jure delegations of authority to make
government policy. For this reason, I believed that Midcal should be modified so that
wherever there is a de facto "clear articulation"--wherever the "challenged restraint.., is
made under such circumstances that the defendant is effectively able to write state
policy," Sagers, supra note 88, at 1417-then Midcal immunity should be available if
there was also "active supervision." See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06 (citation omitted). But
the point was not to protect the SSO. Rather, the courts routinely mischaracterized SSOs
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Again, any approach to this fundamental problem of
government-and-the-marketplace will have to tackle basic
theoretical problems; I think these problems are nicely
illuminated by this little doctrinal alternative. As I explained in
that earlier paper, and as I still think is true, the serious problem
with existing Midcal doctrine is its implicit commitment to a
rigid public-private distinction. The distinction does not work as
a judicially administrable doctrine, and, despite the strong
instincts of most of the federal bench, it is neither compelled by
the Sherman Act99 or its history, nor does it serve any
substantive purpose of antitrust policy.' °° Moreover, the
argument in my earlier paper could be made without criticizing
any Supreme Court opinion and only distinguishing one small
portion of (inapt and often misunderstood) language in Allied
Tube."' I believed this was important because it ran counter to
the strong instinct of the federal courts and most other lawyers
that my suggestion would unfairly-indeed, in a manner
contrary to the very foundations of the American Way-hold
"private" entities responsible for consequences "caused" by
12
government. 0
With this being said, my alternative still leaves a lot to be
desired: it might appear to threaten antitrust liability for all
kinds of lobbying since common anecdotal experience reports that
legislation is routinely adopted that was drafted by lobbyists,
enacted as law more or less verbatim, and passed by legislators
who have never even read it.'0 3 Indeed, under this theory, there
would be no real reason that lobbyists of the federal government
should not face antitrust liability if they come to have de facto
policymaking capacity.

as mere private supplicants of government precisely because the "clear articulation"
requirement left Noerr as their only possible avenue for immunity. Sagers, supranote 88,
at 1416. Creating a possibility of immunity for de facto deputies might help clear up that
confusion. See id. at 1416-17 (proposing the Midcal strict de jure requirement be relaxed
to allow for situations where state policymaking has in effect been delegated).
99.
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
100.
See Sagers, supra note 88, at 1409-10.
101.
See id. at 1418-20 (suggesting an alternative analysis of the Allied Tube issues
without reference to the public-private distinction).
102.
See id. at 1420 (examining policy rationale behind these instincts).
103.
Cf FAHRENHEIT 9/11 (Lions Gate Films 2004) (showing Representative John
Conyers, during an interview with filmmaker Michael Moore, responding to a question
seeking to understand how so many congresspersons voted on the USA PATRIOT Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.), before reading it: "Sit down, my son. We don't read most of the bills.").
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V. THE LIKELIHOOD OF EVER ACTUALLY DOING
ANYTHING ABOUT IT
Truly addressing the problem of cases like Love Terminal
Partners-andaddressing them as antitrust problems-calls for
two significant developments, neither of which seems especially
likely. First, a more comprehensive theoretical framework for
application of competition policy to politics would need to be
devised. Second, there would have to be a political will to impose
that theory in ways that would run contrary to certain strong
instincts in our philosophy of liberal capitalism, and that would
gore some pretty sacred private sector cattle.
Fundamentally, the framework now existing as the state
action and Noerr immunities should be revised into a
comprehensive, uniform theory. However discrete and separate
they may seem, any effective approach should see these two as
complementary applications of one internally coherent policy.
This is because the two situations that these doctrines deal
with-private supplication of government and (usually
responsive) government action°-are part of one problem. That
unitary problem is the fluid, changing institutional amalgam of
forces that make our policy, which is only poorly captured by the
traditional dichotomy between "government" and "business." In
other words, the problem is that the immunities have
incorporated a bright public-private distinction, making them
poorly suited to serve the real policies of either antitrust or
constitutional law. It is hazardous to continue applying these
rules without putting them in context of the overall relation of
government and marketplace. The courts have recognized this in
some sense,' °5 but they normally give no explicit attention to the
overall theoretical picture when applying the doctrines to
individual cases.
Within the unified theory I envision, it is absolutely critical
that two things be established-two corrections to doctrinal
mistakes that have caused inadequacy and confusion in the case
law and will frustrate meaningful reform. First, it should be
made clear that the protection given to "petitioning" under the
Noerr doctrine is not required by the First Amendment. This

104. See Sagers, supra note 88, at 1408 (examining the types of immunity available
to the two distinct, recognized classes of potential defendants: state actors and private
persons).
105.
See, for example, Justice Scalia's famous and oft-quoted observation in City of
Columbia: "Parkerand Noerr are complementary expressions of the principle that the
antitrust laws regulate business, not politics...." City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991).
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really should not be controversial. As the Noerr Court itself was
careful to point out, the doctrine was merely a pragmatic
construction of the Sherman Act,"°6 and as soon as any careful
thought is given to it, the idea that the Noerr rules are required
by the First Amendment would produce a number of absurd and
problematic results. 7 But, nevertheless, many, many people,
including several federal courts of appeals, have gotten this
wrong,' 8 and so has at least one Supreme Court Justice. 9
Second, the unified theory should do away entirely with the
notion that immunity depends on whether some government
entity "caused" the harm in question. Government "cause"
apparently holds mystifying, talismanic significance for most
courts, and in fact, this is the main tool by which the publicprivate distinction operates within the immunities doctrines.
However, the courts never seem much to consider (1)just how
irrelevant government "cause" actually is to either antitrust
policy or the constitutional values they believe they are
protecting or, (2) how quickly the causation inquiry creates a
formalistic loophole for private-sector entities to make the policy
they want, with little or no government input, and then bless it
with a nearly impenetrable antitrust immunity by the simple
artifice of getting it rubberstamped by some friendly government
body. As for whether government causation is relevant to
important policies, recall that prior to the mid-nineteenth
century, the larger competitive concern in American politics was
not ill-gotten private monopoly, but government-granted
monopoly." Moreover, whatever might be the costs of such an
106. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
132 n.6 (1961) (explaining First Amendment defense was not applicable to the analysis of
the case). For argument on this point, see Christopher L. Sagers, The Legal Structure of
American Freedom and the Provenance of the Antitrust Immunities, 2002 UTAH L. REV.
927, 946-71 (discussing at length the relationship between petitioning immunity and
First Amendment protections).
107. See Sagers, supra note 106, at 951-68.
108.
Notably, a number of courts, state legislators, and law professors during the
past two decades have opposed what they call "SLAPP" suits (standing for "Strategic
Litigation Against Public Participation") and have argued that "SLAPP" suits are
unconstitutional on the theory that the Noerr doctrine is itself an application of the
Petition Clause of the First Amendment. For discussion of cases and scholarly literature
on this matter, see id. at 946-50.
109. Namely, Justice Douglas appears to have created the basis for the confusion in
one off-hand dictum in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508, 512-13 (1972). For detailed explanation of how his moment of carelessness caused
decades of confusion and scores of poorly decided judicial opinions, see Sagers, supra note
106, at 946-50.
110. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: AND
THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1948) (explaining that because businesses had to apply directly
to state legislature for incorporation, the legislature could close out opportunities for
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approach (and the burdening of private defendants with costs
properly to be borne by government is the chief defense of a
bright distinction based on government causation), many of those
costs belong appropriately on the shoulders of the business
entities that had become so close to state and local government,
and not on consumers. On the other hand, if the fear is that
government defendants will be too heavily burdened by antitrust,
federal statute already protects local governments, their officials,
and persons acting under their direction from money damages,
interest, fees, or costs."

people without much influence or power); HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937 (1991) (noting that state and local governments granted
numerous monopolies in an attempt to encourage economic development); STANLEY I.
KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE
(1971) (discussing the challenge faced by courts in the nineteenth century when
government-granted monopolies outlived their usefulness); see also Omni Outdoor Adver.,
499 U.S. at 386 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's grant of state action
immunity to defendant city, noting that classic common law examples of trade restraint
involved government-granted monopoly).
111.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 35(a), 36(a) (2000) (explaining that no claim for damages may
be sustained against a party acting in his official capacity on behalf of the government).
See generally ABA, STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS, supra note 20, at 285-90.
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